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INTRODUCTION 
Europe is awash in waste. The European Community (EC or 
Community) is an engine producing billions of tons of industrial, 
consumer, and organic waste every year. l The EC's population 
of over 340 million people inhabits an area approximately one 
quarter the size of the United States, yet the infrastructure and 
regulatory regime necessary to handle discarded matter varies 
from country to country.2 The EC's Member States have entered 
into a free trade compact to eliminate internal trade barriers. 
Inconsistent waste laws and environmental enforcement among 
Member States, however, pose a challenge to the economic inte-
gration of the Community. 
* A.B., Dartmouth; J.D., Harvard; M. St., Oxford. Mr. Feeley practices environmental 
law with Latham & Watkins in Los Angeles. He is Chairman of the Los Angeles County 
Bar's International Environmental Subsection. 
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Latham & Watkins in Los Angeles. 
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1 It has been estimated that waste amounting to 2.2 billion metric tons is generated in 
Europe each year with clean-up costs running into the hundreds of billions of dollars. See 
Joel Havemann, Europe'S Toxic-Waste Problems Mount, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 23, 
1991, at 5-C. In fact, the European waste management market is expected to be valued 
at over $60 billion by the year 2000. European Waste Management Market Seen Topping $60 
Billion by 2000, INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT, Oct. 2, 1991, at 1. 
2 In some areas, however, there is disposal capacity for only 50 percent of the waste 
produced. The shortage of disposal sites has led to illegal disposal and the increased 
exportation of waste. Illegal dumping has, in many places, become the rule instead of the 
exception. For example, officials in Italy estimate that producers dispose of 80 percent 
of all hazardous waste illegally. Paul Luiki & Dale Stephenson, European Community Waste 
Policy: At the Brink of a New Era, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), July 17, 1991, at 403. 
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Divergent approaches to environmental protection in Member 
States could lead to development of de facto non-tariff trade bar-
riers which could distort competition.3 States with lenient waste 
laws or enforcement policies, in effect, would grant their waste 
producers an economic advantage over producers located in 
states with stricter approaches. The advantage would arise from 
the lower liability risks incurred by producers, carriers, and dis-
posal facilities in the more permissive states as well as from lower 
operating costs. These cost savings could be internalized and used 
to promote economic growth, or passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower prices. Many in the EC also fear that an inconsistent 
waste structure would encourage Member States to shift produc-
tion and disposal, transforming those countries receiving waste 
into "Toxic States."4 
Furthermore, the environmental devastation of the dissolved 
Soviet Empire provides a stark warning to the Community of the 
dangers in continuing to operate without a comprehensive ap-
proach to waste.5 The powerful Green parties of the EC are 
seizing upon the environmental tragedy of eastern Europe as a 
strong rallying point to enact an effective waste regulatory system, 
as the Community envisioned two decades ago. 
The EC has long been aware of the waste issue both in eastern 
Europe and in the Community. The EC first focused on the 
problem of waste with its adoption of Council Directive 75/442, 
the Framework Waste Directive, in 1975.6 Nonetheless, few 
productive efforts to develop a waste regulatory regime 
occurred until the Seveso incident in 19837 and the Sandoz 
3 Id. at 404. 
4 Id. 
5 For example, one source reports that in Czechoslovakia, 70 percent of the rivers are 
badly polluted; in Poland, half of the cities and 35 percent of industries do not treat 
sewage and other waste; in former East Germany, 15,000 hazardous waste sites have not 
yet been evaluated and a third of the rivers and 9,000 lakes are biologically dead; and in 
Hungary, where 44 percent of sewage treatment plants only provide crude treatment, 
700 of the country's wells are contaminated. See Michael Parrish, E. Europe Seeks Way to 
Pay Environmental Cleanup Tab, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1991, at 1. 
6 Council Directive 75/442, 1975 OJ. (L 194) 47 [hereinafter Framework Directive]. 
7 The Seveso incident actually happened in 1976, when a chemical plant in Seveso, 
Italy exploded and released large quantities of dioxin causing vast air pollution and 
contaminated waste. In March 1983, however, 41 barrels of the dioxin-contaminated 
waste from Seveso were discovered in France, having been transported without detection. 
The incident showed how easily hazardous waste could be transported across international 
borders without detection. See F. James Handley, Hawrdous Waste Exports: A Leak in the 
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spill8 in 1986. The Seveso incident concerned the covert shipment 
of dozens of barrels of waste contaminated with dioxin from Italy 
to France.9 The discovery of the waste stockpiled in a French 
barn caused a popular outcry in the Community and resulted in 
the enactment of the Council Directive on the Supervision and 
Control Within the European Community of the Transfrontier 
Shipment of Hazardous Waste.lO The Sandoz spill involved the 
accidental discharge of an enormous amount of toxic chemicals 
from a Swiss warehouse into the Rhine River in 1986. The spill 
contaminated the Rhine and adjacent properties in Switzerland, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 1I The graphic coverage 
of the accident fueled public awareness of potential and actual 
environmental damage. 12 
The combination of the sheer volume of waste and inadequate 
infrastructure, the scheduled economic integration of the Com-
munity, the rise of the Green parties, the experience of the Soviet 
bloc, and the publicized environmental catastrophes prompted 
an effort to develop and harmonize an environmental legal strat-
egy, including a waste management regulatory structure. 13 In 
1987, the Single European Act (SEA)14 amended the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).15 
The SEA articulates the Community's environmental objectives 
in Article 132r: 1) to preserve, protect, and improve the quality 
of the environment; 2) to contribute toward the protection of 
System of International Legal Controls, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,171, 10,172 
(1989); see generally THOMAS WHITESIDE, THE PENDULUM AND THE TOXIC CLOUD (1979). 
8 See generally Aaron Schwabach, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International Law to 
Protect the Rhine from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (1989). 
9 See Handley, supra note 7, at 10,172. 
10 See id.; Teresa A. Wallbaum, America's Lethal Export: The Growing Trade in Hazardous 
Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 889,905 n.l77 (1991). 
II See Schwabach, supra note 8, at 443-48. 
12 Id. at 452-53. 
13 Public awareness of the importance of confronting environmental issues is sweeping 
the globe, particularly in the more affluent nations. See, e.g., Michael S. Feeley, Reclaiming 
the Beautiful Island: Taiwan's Emerging Environmental Regulation, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 907 
(1990). 
14 Single European Act, 1987 0.]. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA]. The major goal of the 
Act is to complete the EC's internal market by December 31, 1992. See George A. 
Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Community, COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 529, 535-38 (1989). For a description of the SEA's impact on the EC legislative 
process, see Michael S. Feeley & Peter M. Gilhuly, Green Law-making: A Primer on the 
European Community's Environmental Legislative Process, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 
672-76,679-83 (1991). 
15 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]. 
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human health; and 3) to ensure a prudent and rational utilization 
of natural resources. 16 
Furthermore, Article 130r defines the basic triad principles-
"polluter pays," proximity, and prevention-on which Commu-
nity environmental action should be based. The "polluter pays" 
principle states that those responsible for the creation of the waste 
should pay for the harm caused by it; the proximity principle 
requires waste to be disposed of at the facility closest to its place 
of origin; and the preventive principle asserts that action should 
be taken to prevent environmental harm, not merely to remediate 
the injury after it has occurredY These principles are not uni-
versally supported and remain the subject of continuing political 
negotiations as to their appropriateness, meaning, and extent, yet 
they are the centerpiece of the Community's attempt to craft a 
waste management regulatory regime. 
Incorporating these principles, the European Commission has 
developed the proposed Directive for Civil Liability for Damages 
Caused by Waste (1989 Proposal) as an integral part of the EC's 
comprehensive approach to waste,18 but the Proposal is languish-
ing under widespread criticism and remains in legislative limbo. 
It is unclear whether the 1989 Proposal is permanently shelved 
or will be resurrected in the coming year. Almost twenty years 
have elapsed since the Community mandated the enactment of a 
waste strategy; the uncertain fate of the 1989 Proposal illustrates 
that the Community has yet to forge a consensus on how to 
regulate waste. 
The 1989 Proposal, as amended, is a case study on how the 
lack of agreement on fundamental environmental legal principles 
can paralyze the enactment of a common approach to waste 
management. This Article seeks to cull out the conflicting posi-
tions of the various players in order to better understand the 
political, legal, and policy choices posed by the proposed directive. 
To accomplish this task, Part I sets forth the political system in 
16 [d. at art. 132r. 
17 EEC Treaty Article 130r states: I) "that preventive action should be taken;" 2) "that 
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at the source;" and 3) "that the 
polluter should pay." [d. at art. 130r. 
18 The proposed directive was initially proposed in 1989. Commission Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1989 0.]. (C 251) 3 
[hereinafter 1989 Proposal). The 1989 Proposal was amended in 1991. Amended Com-
mission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 
1991 OJ. (C 192) 6 [hereinafter Amended Proposal). 
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which the proposed directive is shaped by briefly presenting the 
background of the EC, describing its major institutions, its legis-
lative process, and its forms of legislation. Part II describes the 
historical development, legal basis, and significant provisions of 
the 1989 Proposal, and explores the major issues targeted by 
Community commentators. Special attention is accorded to the 
positions taken by the Select Committee of the European Com-
munities appointed by the British House of Lords, as the United 
Kingdom will hold the presidency of the Council for the second 
half of 1992 when the fate of the proposed directive may be 
decided. Part III discusses the proposed amendments to the 1989 
Proposal, which the Commission released in 1991 after evaluating 
the comments on the proposed directive, including the views of 
the European Parliament. The Article concludes with a reflection 
on the uncertain future of the proposed directive. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE EC POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
A. Background of Community Law 
The Community is a supra-national, treaty-based organiza-
tion,19 composed of twelve Member States.20 The EC is an eco-
nomic community whose main purpose is the establishment of a 
common market which would allow goods, services, and capital 
19 The European Community is actually three communities. It operates under three 
separate treaties: the EEC Treaty; the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC 
ENERGY COMMUNITY; and the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL 
COMMUNITY. Although each treaty established a separate, autonomous grouping of coun-
tries for a particular purpose of economic integration, the EEC Treaty is by far the most 
important because it provides for the establishment of a general common market and the 
establishment of several common institutions. 
Membership in these three treaty groups overlaps. The adoption of the Merger Treaty 
in 1965 effectively combined the three separate communities created by these treaties. 
JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 3 (1988); see Treaty Establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities of April 8, 1965, 1967 
OJ. (L 152) 2 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]. Today, the main treaty of importance, gov-
erning Community affairs generally, and environmental policy specifically, is the EEC 
Treaty. See Thomas H. Reynolds, Introduction to the European Economic Community: Its History 
and Institutions, 8 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 3/4, 1988, at 7, 12-13. Thus the terms 
"European Community" and "European Economic Community" are often used inter-
changeably. 
20 The six original Member States are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. Subsequendy, six other countries joined the Community: Denmark, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom (1972); Greece (1979); and Portugal and Spain (1984). 
See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Single European Act, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 
371,371 (1990); EEC TREATY art. 227. 
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to move freely across its Member States' national borders.21 The 
final steps towards realization of this "free market" ideal are 
expected by the end of 1992.22 
Community law is "a peculiar mix of international and domestic 
law. "23 In areas where the EEC Treaty provides a legal basis, 
Community law is supreme over national law, and no Member 
State may enact any statute that deviates from EC law.24 Individ-
ual states may enact their own national legislation whenever the 
EC has not addressed the relevant area at the Community level. 25 
Even when the EC has adopted Community standards, they are 
usually in the form of directives, which require Member States 
to enact implementing legislation giving effect to the directives.26 
Consequently, the vast majority of EC law, including environ-
mental law, exists in the form of the national legislation of indi-
vidual Member States. These states have principal responsibility 
for implementing and enforcing the Community policies encom-
passed therein.27 
B. Major Institutions of the EC 
The EC, like many political systems, is composed of several 
interactive parts. Each constitutive element has its own peculiar 
function in the complex legislative process. The major institutions 
21 ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 15 
(Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985). Essentially this requires the creation of a customs 
union and the abolition of all restrictions on the movement of the factors of production. 
Mark L. Jones, Symposium 1992: Doing Business in the European Internal Market, Putting 
"1992" in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 463, 466 (1989). These goals are encom-
passed in the four freedoms sought under the EEC Treaty: free movement of goods; 
persons; services; and capital. EEC TREATY art. 8a. 
22 A white paper drafted by the European Commission calls for adoption of nearly 
300 legislative measures by the end of 1992 aimed at achieving a common market. See 
generally Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council, COM(85) 310 final. These measures have given rise to slogans like 
"Project 1992" and "EC 1992." See generally, C. Ehlermann, The "1992 Project": Stages, 
Structures, Results and Prospects, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097, 1098 (1990). 
23 Conor Quigley, EC Law: Litigation and the Environment, in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 288 (Patrick E. 
Thieffry & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 1990). 
24 See generally STEINER, supra note 19, at 30-39 (discussion of Member States adoption 
of principle of EEC law supremacy); Case 106177, Administrazione delle Finance dello 
Stato v. Simmenthal, 3 E.C.R. 629 (1978); EEC TREATY art. 5. 
25 See generally Auke Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case 
Study in Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 311 (1989). 
26 See infra Section I(D). 
27 See infra Section I(D). 
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of the EC, as set out in the EEC Treaty, are the European Com-
mission (Commission), the Council of the European Community 
(Council), the European Parliament (Parliament), and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ).28 To comprehend the proposed 
waste directive, one must understand these institutions and how 
the legislative drafting process operates. 
1. The European Commission 
The Commission, which is headquartered in Brussels, essen-
tially acts as the executive branch of the EC.29 The Commission 
plays an extremely important role in the legislative process. It is 
responsible for proposing virtually all new legislation to the Coun-
cil. 30 In fact, the Commission drafted the proposals for the 1992 
program.31 In proposing new legislation, the Commission will 
typically consult interested parties, including government offi-
cials, private parties, and trade associations although there is no 
formal process that r,equires it to do SO.32 Additionally, under the 
"cooperation procedqre,"33 the Commission has the opportunity 
to re-examine proposals following review by Parliament. Finally, 
the Commission always retains the ultimate discretion to amend 
or withdraw any proposal under consideration at any time during 
the legislative process prior to final passage. 34 
The Commission is responsible for ensuring "the proper func-
tioning and development of the common market."35 The Com-
28 A fifth noteworthy EC institution is the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). It 
serves as an advisory body to the Council and Commission pursuant to EEC Treaty Article 
4(2). The ESC is appointed by the Council from three general groups: I) employers; 2) 
workers (primarily consisting of trade unionists); and 3) others (including representatives 
of farmers, consumers, and professionals). Under some circumstances the ESC has the 
right to issue its opinion on Community proposals prior to enactment by the Council. 
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 36 (Tony Honore & 
Joseph Raz eds., 1990). 
29 See generally id. at 8-13. 
30 See EEC TREATY art. 155; AUDREY WINTER ET AL., EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A 
LAWYER'S GUIDE 25, 27-28 (2d ed. 1989). The Council may, however, request certain 
proposals it deems desirable. EEC TREATY art. 152. 
31 See Eleanor Roberts Lewis & Mark Adam Goldstein, The Effect of EC 1992 on U.S. 
Companies: A U.S. Government Perspective, 3 TEMPLE INT'L & COMPo L.J. 153, 156 (1989). 
32 WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 42, 44. 
33 See infra Section I(B). For a complete discussion of the development of EC legislation 
and the various procedures utilized therein, see Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 671-
76 (1991). 
34 WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 45. 
35 EEC TREATY art. 155. 
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mission serves as a watchdog over the Member States to ensure 
their compliance with the EEC Treaty and Community law. When 
a Member State fails to comply, the Commission may open infor-
mal discussions and issue instructions for compliance to the of-
fending Member State.36 The Commission may also issue a "rea-
soned opinion" stating the alleged violation, reasons for the 
Commission's conclusions, and deadlines for compliance.37 Fi-
nally, the Commission may request that the ECl issue a final 
determination of Treaty or Community law regarding the alleged 
violation.38 
2. The Council 
The Council of the European Communities39 is the main de-
cision-making body of the EC, having the final vote on all legis-
lation. It adopts, revises, or rejects the proposals of the Commis-
sion. The Council is composed of one voting representative from 
each Member State, each directly representing the interests of its 
own nation.40 Member States do not designate a particular indi-
vidual as their voting representative, therefore the individual 
voting at any given meeting may vary depending on the subject 
under consideration.41 One representative serves as Council pres-
ident.42 The Council operates under its own rules of procedure,43 
36 janet Zagorin, Europe 1992: Navigating New Waters (Baker & McKenzie, New York, 
N.Y.),jan. 1990, at 5. The Member State is usually given about two months to comply. 
37 See EEC TREATY art. 169. 
38 1d. 
39 This is the official name of the Council although it is often referred to as "the 
Council of Ministers" or simply as "the Council." See generally HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 
13-20. The Council is not to be confused with the "European Council," which consists of 
the heads of state of the EC Member States and the president of the Commission. The 
European Council's main purpose is to provide policy guidance to other EC institutions. 
JAMES GARDENER, EFFECTIVE LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17 (1991). 
40 EEC TREATY art. 148; Merger Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 2. 
41 Generally each Member State is represented on the Council by the national minister 
for the topic area under consideration. Anyone may be present, however, including the 
heads of state when certain high level policy matters are discussed. STEINER, supra note 
19, at 10. 
42 The role of Council President rotates among Member States for six-month terms. 
WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 29. The order of this control is Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and the United Kingdom. For the second six months of 1992, the President of the Council 
will be a representative from the United Kingdom. 
43 [d. (citing Rules of Procedure of the Council 79/868, 1979 OJ. (L 268) 1, modified by 
19870.]. (L 291) 27). 
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its meetings are closed to the public, and its records are confi-
dential.44 
The EEC Treaty authorizes the Council to act by a simple 
majority, a qualified majority, or by unanimous vote, depending 
on the nature of the matter under consideration.45 The SEA 
specifies that only a "qualified majority"46 is necessary for certain 
vital legislation. This includes legislation to complete the internal 
market by 1992, and legislation to preserve, protect, and improve 
the environment.47 
Despite its power to vote on all EC legislation, the Council's 
powers are somewhat limited. Generally, the Council may act only 
on legislative proposals the Commission submits to it, although 
the Council has some power to suggest proposals to the Com-
mission.48 The Council is required by the EEC Treaty to consult 
Parliament on all proposals,49 and all the council's actions are 
subject to judicial review by the ECj.50 
3. The European Parliament 
Parliament5l is the only EC institution composed of represen-
tatives or Members of Parliament (MEPs) elected directly by cit-
izens of Member States. 52 It is not, however, a parliamentary body 
in the traditional sense. Rather, it serves an advisory and super-
visory function, participating in the legislative process at several 
different points. 53 Various treaty provisions require that the 
Council consult Parliament on any legislation proposed in certain 
areas before the Council may enact the legislation.54 
44 !d. 
45 See generally id. at 30-31. 
46 "Qualified majority" voting is weighted by country so that the larger countries do 
not represent a controlling voting block. Id. at 30 n.26; see infra note 79. 
47 See SEA, supra note 14, at art. 100a. Prior to the enactment of the SEA, most 
substantial Council decisions required unanimity. See infra note 79. 
48 Reynolds, supra note 19, at 22; WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 30. 
49 WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 30. 
50 See HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 58. 
51 The European Parliament was originally known as the "European Assembly." See R. 
Beiber, et aI., Implications of the Single Act for the European Parliament, 23 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 767, 770-71 (1986). 
52 Direct elections were first instituted in 1979, resulting in increased legitimacy, power, 
and influence for Parliament. STEINER, supra note 19, at 8. The term for each MEP is five 
years. WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 31. 
53 STEINER, supra note 19, at 8; Reynolds, supra note 19, at 18-19; EEC TREATY art. 
137; see infra Section I(B). 
54 See Reynolds, supra note 19, at 18-19. 
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The importance of Parliament's comments in the legislative 
process has increased substantially since the SEA implemented 
the cooperation procedure for certain legislative proposals.55 In 
the past, the Council was virtually free to ignore Parliament's 
comments; now, Parliament has greater power to block or delay 
legislation that it opposes.56 The new procedure gives Parliament 
a second reading of certain draft proposals and it may reject 
them. If it does reject a proposal, its passage requires a unani-
mous Council vote. Parliament may also submit its own amend-
ments which, if supported by the Commission, can be defeated 
only by a unanimous Council vote. 57 
Parliament may also indirectly influence EC policy. For exam-
ple, because the Commission is directly subordinate to Parlia-
ment,58 Parliament has the right to submit written questions to 
which the Commission must respond.59 Parliament also has the 
power to dismiss the Commission in its entirety and may reject 
any annual EC budget proposed by the Commission.60 Notwith-
standing Parliament's influence and increased participation in 
decision-making, the power it exercises still largely depends on 
the actions taken by the Council and the Commission.61 
4. The European Court of justice 
The fourth principal political institution created by the EEC 
Treaty is the ECj, which sits in Luxembourg.62 The ECj is com-
posed of thirteen judges, one appointed from each Member State, 
55 See Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 671-74. 
56 Although the Council must consider these opinions, they are still not obliged to 
follow them. STEINER, supra note 19, at 8. In order to pass legislation which Parliament 
opposes, however, the Council must reach unanimous approval. See Reynolds, supra note 
19, at 19; see also Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 671-74. 
57 For a detailed description of the process under the SEA, see Feeley & Gilhuly, supra 
note 14, at 671-74,679-82 citing WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 41-44. 
5. Zagorin, supra note 36, at 4. 
59 EEC TREATY art. 140. Parliament may submit questions to the Council as well, but 
it is not required to respond. WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 33. 
60 Martin E. Elling, The Emerging European Community: A Framework for Institutional and 
LegalAnalysis, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 511, 521 (1990); GARDENER, supra note 
39, at 19. 
61 Beiber et aI., supra note 51, at 791. 
62 The formal name of the ECJ is "the Court of Justice for the European Communities" 
but it is commonly referred to as "the European Court of Justice." See generally HARTLEY, 
supra note 28, at 49-82; CarlO. Lenz, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 14 
EUR. L. REV. 127 (1989). 
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and one in rotation from among the five largest states,63 who 
must have independence of an "undisputed nature."64 The judges 
are appointed for six-year renewable terms.65 The ECl has pri-
mary jurisdiction over all questions relating to Community law. 
It interprets this law and settles any disputes regarding its appli-
cation.66 The Commission may bring a claim before the Court.67 
Additionally, any Member State, individual, or firm "directly af-
fected" by EC laws or rulings68 may present a claim to the ECl. 
The ECl also has the power to decide interlocutory requests from 
Member States' national courts regarding EC law, and may advise 
other EC institutions in certain areas.69 Its decisions must be 
unanimous, and once issued are final and not subject to appeaJ.7o 
Although the Court was originally expected to play only a 
minor part in shaping Community law, it has greatly influenced 
EC law through the judicial review process.7l Still, despite its 
powers to decide cases and interpret Community law, the ECl's 
influence is greatly limited because it has no enforcement pow-
ers.72 It cannot impose fines or sanctions.73 
63 WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 33. 
64 See EEC TREATY art. 167. 
65 [d. 
66 GARDENER, supra note 39, 20-21. 
67 EEC TREATY art. 169. 
68 Id. at art. 173. The effect must be directly on the individual claimant, and cannot 
merely affect the claimant as a member of a class or group. Quigley, supra note 23, at 
294. These individual claims may even be brought by foreign (or non-member) firms, if 
they feel unfairly penalized by an act of a Member State or business. Zagorin, supra note 
36, at 6. 
69 EEC TREATY art. 177. The ECJ may advise EC institutions through preliminary 
rulings regarding the interpretation of the EEC Treaty, the validity and interpretation of 
acts of the institutions of the Community, and the interpretation of the statutes of bodies 
established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. See id. 
70 Zagorin, supra note 36, at 6. 
71 See WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 34; Reynolds, supra note 19, at 24-25. One 
commentator has described the ECJ as a "secret ally of integration and ... pro-environ-
ment." Panel Discussions, in UNDERSTANDING U.S. AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A 
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, 59, 65 (Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Pascale Kromarek eds., 1989) 
(statements of Ludwig Kramer). 
72 Instead, the Court must rely on Community politics and pressure from other Member 
States to force compliance. See REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 145; Reynolds, 
supra note 19, at 26. 
73 See New Unit Would Police Member's Actions in Implementing Environmental Standards, 13 
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.2, at 42 (Feb. 14, 1990). Carlo Ripa di Meana, the Environ-
mental Commissioner of the EC, has complained that some countries have simply ignored 
Court judgments ordering them to comply with Community environmental standards. 
David W. Johnston, Note, The European Community'S Amended Waste Directive, 14 B.C. INT'L 
& COMPo L. REV. 413, 416 n. 21 (1991). 
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C. The EC Legislative Process 
The EEC Treaty sets out the process by which the EC enacts 
legislation. The exact procedure used, and the roles of the various 
actors in this procedure, vary depending upon the EEC Treaty 
article serving as the basis for the legislation. The procedure 
generally begins with a proposed draft from the Commission. 
The draft is then critiqued and amended based on comments 
from Parliament, and sometimes from the Economic and Social 
Committee of the Community (ESC), before it is finally voted 
upon by the Council.74 Generally, a unanimous vote of all Council 
representatives is required to ratify the legislation. Since the 
adoption of the SEA,75 however, the initial procedure has 
changed.76 It provides increased access to the process for certain 
Community institutions77 and permits the easier passage78 of cer-
tain legislation under a "qualified majority" vote.79 
D. The Form of EC Legislation 
The EEC Treaty provides several mechanisms for implement-
ing Community laws. EC legislation, which must be initiated by 
74 See HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 37. 
75 The SEA is the first and only amendment to the EEC Treaty. It became effective on 
January I, 1987. See generally A. Arnull, The Single European Act, 11 EUR. L. REV. 388 
(1986); Reynolds, supra note 19, at 33. 
76 For an overview of the changes the SEA makes, see Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, 
at 672-76. Of particular importance in the environmental area was the addition of Title 
VII to the EEC Treaty, which explicitly articulates and defines the goals of the Community 
to include the protection of the environment and improvement of the quality of life for 
the people ofthe Community. WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 135; see also STEINER, supra 
note 19, at 4. 
77 See supra Part I(B)(I)-(3); see also Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 672-76. 
78 This "easier passage," which involves qualified majority voting on certain directives 
is actually found outside of Article VII, in EEC Treaty art. 100a. 
79 Under the qualified majority voting system, each Member State is assigned a number 
of votes based upon its relative size, importance, and economic power. A proposal must 
receive a qualified majority of the votes available (54 out of 76) in order to be approved. 
EEC TREATY art. 148(2). For a complete discussion of the distinctions between the qual-
ified majority procedure and the unanimous consent requirement, see Feeley & Gilhuly, 
supra note 14, at 675-76. 
The SEA gives the Community the ability to pass environmental legislation by a qualified 
majority vote using the cooperation procedure set forth in Article 100a. SEA, supra note 
14, at art. 25. Although the main goal of Article 100 is to promote legislation having as 
its objective "the establishment and functioning of the internal market," subparagraph 3 
explicitly provides that environmental legislation may be based upon this article as well. 
EEC TREATY art. 100a(3). This section provides: "The Commission, in its proposals 
envisaged [under this Article) concerning health, safety, environmental protection and 
consumer protection, will take as its base level a high level of protection." [d. 
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the Commission, takes one of three main forms: 1) general rul-
ings or decisions; 2) regulations; or 3) directives.80 The legal basis 
for a given action and the circumstances surrounding the partic-
ular case dictate which procedure will be utilized.81 
General rulings or decisions are directed toward a particular 
Member State or individual and are binding only upon the party 
to whom they are addressed.82 Regulations, on the other hand, 
are broad, general statements of Community law. Regulations 
applied in a Member State operate like any national law, but they 
are also "directly applicable" to every Member State and citizen 
of the EC.83 Although the EEC Treaty permits the use of regu-
lations in environmental law, they have rarely been used for 
environmental purposes.84 
The directive is the principal legislative form used by the EC.85 
A directive mandates the result to be achieved but allows the 
Member State's legislature to decide the method.86 Generally, EC 
directives merely set minimum standards, and Member States are 
free to adopt more stringent guidelines as long as they are com-
patible with the EEC Treaty.87 This approach recognizes that the 
80 EEC TREATY art. 189. Article 189 also provides for the issuance of recommendations 
and opinions which have no binding force and are not properly classified as legislation. 
See Nigel Haigh, Impact of the EEC Environmental Programme: The British Example, 4 CONN. 
J. INT'L L. 453, 456 (1989). 
81 WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 41. 
82 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty states: "A decision shall be binding in its entirety 
upon those to whom it is addressed." EEC TREATY art. 189. 
83 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty also states: "A regulation shall have general applica-
tion. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States." Id. 
The phrase "directly applicable" means that the legislation grants individuals rights which 
must be upheld by the national courts and is binding on all citizens of the Community 
upon its adoption and no Member State implementation is necessary. See HARTLEY, supra 
note 28, at 183-84. 
84 Haigh, supra note 80, at 456. One notable use of a regulation, however, was a ban 
on the import of whale products. 
85 On the differences between directives and regulations, see Yves Quintin, Certain 
Institutional Aspects of "Europe 1992" and Their Effects on American Companies, 3 TEMP. INT'L 
& COMPo L.J. 143, 147-48 (1989). 
86 Quigley, supra note 23, at 293. 
87 Article 130t of the EEC Treaty states: "The protective measures adopted in common 
pursuant to Article 130s shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or intro-
ducing more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty." See EEC TREATY 
art. IOOa(4) (providing special Commission procedure to authorize deviation from EEC 
law on grounds of "m~or [state] needs ... relating to protection of the environment"). 
In no case, however, may these stricter requirements "constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." Id. at arts. 36, 
IOOa(4). Overly strict environmental standards may thus be challenged before the Com-
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Member States are generally more aware of the social and political 
environment in their countries and are thus able to choose the 
most effective way to accomplish the directive's objective.88 The 
main role in implementing the vast majority of EC legislation 
thus falls upon the Member States themselves. The EC also relies 
on Member States to enforce the national legislation implement-
ing EC directives.89 In this process, the EC mainly acts to for-
mulate Community policy, and to oversee Member State compli-
ance with,90 and enforcement of, these directives.91 
II. PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY WASTE: THE 1989 PROPOSAL 
A. Historical Development of the Proposal 
In December 1984, the Council issued a Directive on the Su-
pervision and Control Within the European Community of the 
Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste (Directive on Waste 
Shipment).92 Article 11(3) of the Directive provides: "The Council 
shall ... determine not later than 30 September 1988 the con-
ditions for implementing the civil liability of the producer [of 
waste] in the case of damage ... and shall also determine a system 
of insurance."93 The Council's commitment to adopt a directive 
on civil liability for damage caused by waste led to mounting 
public pressure on the Commission to issue a proposal that could 
be enacted by the deadline imposed by the Directive on Waste 
mission as contrary to the EEC Treaty. See David P. Hackett & Elizabeth E. Lewis, European 
Economic Community: Environmental Requirements, in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 253, 256 (Patrick E. Thieffry & 
G. Marc Whitehead eds., 1990). 
88 Haigh, supra note 80, at 456. 
89 REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 137-38; see, e.g., Koenraad Lenaerts, The 
Application of Community Law in Belgium, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 253 (1986). 
90 In this instance, the phrase "compliance with" means that the Member State has 
enacted the legislation necessary to accomplish the Community objective as outlined in 
the directive. See GARDNER, supra note 39, at 29. 
91 The EC has been weak in overseeing Member State enforcement of directives once 
they have been enacted into national law. In fact, of all the infringement proceedings the 
EC has brought, none have ever been targeted at Member State enforcement of Com-
munity directives. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 21, at 144. Thus, despite the goal 
of harmonizing EC law across the entire Community, in reality, Member States are largely 
free to enforce or not enforce EC law. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 670-71. 
92 Council Directive of 6 December 1984 on the Supervision and Control Within the 
European Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, 1984 0.]. (L 
326) 31 (as amended 1986 OJ. (L 181) 13) [hereinafter Directive on Waste Shipment]. 
93 [d. at art. 11(3). 
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Shipment.94 The Commission failed to meet the September 30, 
1988 deadline; however, it eventually submitted the 1989 Pro-
posal.95 
B. Legal Basis for the Proposal 
As described above, the legal basis for proposed EC legislation 
is important as it determines whether a proposal must be passed 
by unanimous vote or by a qualified majority vote. If a directive's 
legal basis is Article VII of the EEC Treaty-as amended by the 
SEA-passage requires a unanimous Council vote. The directive 
thus becomes susceptible to political compromise inherent in ob-
taining unanimity among the Council's diverse membership.96 If, 
however, a directive's legal basis is Article 100a, the SEA's trade 
harmonization article, the Council may pass it by a qualified 
majority vote.97 Directives adopted under Article 100a must be 
submitted to the Parliament-with its increasingly "green" 
representation98-under Article 100a's cooperation procedure.99 
This procedure grants Parliament a much more influential role 
94 Letter from Dr. George Berrisch, Brussels office of the German law firm Schon, 
Nolte, Finkelnburg & Clem, to Peter M. Gilhuly, Latham & Watkins (Sept. 13, 1991) 
(commenting on the 1989 Proposal based on discussion with Commission staff) (on file 
at Latham & Watkins). 
95 The 1989 Proposal was not the first EC environmental legislative attempt. Since 
1973 over 100 environmental measures have been adopted with additional proposals 
constantly being generated. James D. Pagliaro & Brady L. Green, E.C. Directive Proposal 
is Based on CERCLA, NAT'L L.j., Feb. 10, 1992, at 33. Thus far, EC environmental 
legislation has concentrated on the areas of waste disposal and the regulation of intraf-
rontier and transfrontier shipments of waste. Id. Much of the earlier legislation has proven 
ineffective, due in great part to the unique nature of the legislative vehicle used by the 
EC to implement its environmental measures. For a complete description of the forms of 
EC legislation, see supra Section I(D) and accompanying notes. 
96 Article 130s of the EEC Treaty provides: 
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consultation with the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Com-
mittee, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Community [concerning 
the environment). 
The Council shall, under the conditions laid down in the preceeding paragraph, 
define those matters on which decisions are to taken by a qualified m,yority. 
EEC TREATY art. 130s. Note that unless the Council explicitly finds that a decision is to 
be passed by qualified majority vote, Article 130s requires that the traditional consultation 
procedure be utilized and that any environmental legislation so considered be passed by 
unanimous consent. 
97 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
98 See Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 685-86. 
99 SEA, supra note 14, at art. 6. 
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in the legislative process than does the "consultation procedure" 
utilized in cases where a unanimous vote is required. lOo 
The Commission chose Article 100a as the legal basis for the 
1989 Proposal, stating: 
Whereas disparities among laws of the Member States con-
cerning the liability for damage and injury to the environ-
ment caused by waste could lead to artificial patterns of in-
vestment and waste; whereas such a situation could distort 
competition, affect the free movement of goods within the 
internal market, and entail differences in the level of protec-
tion of health, property and the environment; whereas an 
approximation of the laws of the Member States on this 
subject is needed; 
Whereas, since the [enactment] of the Single European Act, 
Article 100a has replaced Article 100 as the appropriate basis 
in the Treaty for approximating national provisions that af-
fect the internal market ... [the Commission] has adopted 
this [Proposal].lOl 
Various sectors of the Community have criticized the Commis-
sion's choice for the 1989 Proposal's legal basis. In its report to 
the British House of Lords, the Select Committee102 determined 
that the appropriate legal basis should be Article 130s, the SEA's 
environmental article, instead of Article 100a. 103 The Select Com-
mittee acknowledged the Commission's argument that Article 
100a should be used because it was the basis for the Directive on 
Waste Shipmentl04 which mandated the creation of civil actions 
to determine liability for damage caused by waste. 105 The Select 
Committee, however, countered that the "predominant purpose" 
100 The main difference between the consultation and the cooperation procedures is 
that under the cooperation procedure, both the Parliament and the Council are each 
given two (as opposed to one) opportunities to review and propose amendments to 
Commission proposals. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 14, at 672-74, citing WINTER ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 30. 
101 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at 3-4. 
102 The Select Committee on the European Communities is appointed by the British 
House of Lords to "consider Community proposals, ... to obtain all necessary information 
about them, and to make reports on those which, in the opinion of the Committee, raise 
important questions of policy or principle .... " SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, TWENTy-FIFTH REpORT, 1990, CMND, at 7 (on file at Latham & Watkins) 
[hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE]. 
103 [d. at 36. 
104 Directive on Waste Shipment, supra note 92, at 13. 
105 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 36. 
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of the 1989 Proposal was the "protection of the environment,"I06 
which comes within the specific ambit of Article 130s. The Select 
Committee also pointed out that the great bulk of evidence it had 
received related to environmental issues as opposed to internal 
market concerns. 107 Moreover, the Select Committee expressed 
its opinion that divergent national approaches to civil liability 
were unlikely to be "a significant obstacle to competition and free 
movement of goods."108 
In 1990, the ESC lO9 reviewed the question of the correct legal 
basis for the 1989 Proposal. Acting at the request of the Council 
pursuant to Article 100a, the ESC issued its Opinion on the 
Proposed Directive for Civil Liability.llo The ESC stated that: "In 
view of, the objectives set out by the Commission ... reference to 
Article 100a is not justified. Reference should be made . . . to 
Articles 130r and s of the Treaty."lll The ESC's Opinion would 
require unanimous approval of the proposed directive, rather 
than ratification by qualified majority. The effect of the ESC's 
Opinion is questionable, however, given the ECl's recent decision 
in its precedent-setting ruling regarding the appropriate legal 
basis for a titanium dioxide directive. ll2 In that case, the ECl 
held that the appropriate legal basis for a directive prohibiting 
the dumping of titanium wastes into waterways, and limiting 
other disposal methods according to the production process used, 
was Article 100a and not Article 130s. This decision is likely to 
allow a much broader use of Article 100a as the legal basis for 




109 For a brief description of the Economic and Social Committee and its place in the 
EC legislative process, see supra note 28. 
110 Economic and Social Committee Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive 
on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1990 OJ. (C 112) 3 [hereinafter ESC 
Opinion]. 
III [d. at 2.1. 
112 Case 300/89, Commission v. Council (june 11, 1991) (on file at Latham & Watkins). 
The Commission had originally based the titanium dioxide directive on Article 100a. The 
Council, however, changed the basis to Article 130s by unanimous vote. When the Com-
mission contested the Council's action before the ECl, the Court upheld the Commission's 
position that Article 100a was the proper legal basis for the directive. The EC] held that 
the environmental concerns addressed in the directive would burden enterprises and 
therefore affect competition in the common market. [d. 
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whether unanimous or qualified majority approval will be nec-
essary for promulgation of the proposed directive. 
C. Significant Provisions of the 1989 Proposal 
The Commission designed the 1989 Proposal with three pri-
mary goals in mind: 1) to encourage producers to adopt measures 
to reduce their production of waste; 2) to promote the internal-
ization of the societal costs associated with waste by encouraging 
producers to include the costs of covering the risks of civil liability 
in the price of goods sold to consumers; and 3) to ensure fair 
compensation for victims of environmental harm. ll3 The purpose 
of the provisions of the 1989 Proposal was to effectuate these 
aims. Its sections, discussed below, addressed the scope ofliability; 
imposed joint and several strict liability; granted standing to vic-
tims of waste, public authorities, and "common interest groups;" 
delineated remedies; established the burden of proof; and set 
time limitations. 114 The central issue of insurance, however, was 
not addressed. 
1. Scope of Liability 
The 1989 Proposal provided civil liability for "producers of 
waste."ll5 It defined "producer" as any entity "whose occupational 
activities produce waste and/or anyone who carries out prepro-
cessing, mixing, or other operations resulting in a change of the 
113 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 
102, at 41 [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum]; Eric Souers, Environmental Law and 
Waste Management 7 (Feb. 20, 1991) (prepared for presentation to the International 
Company Lawyer's Conference in Lisbon, Portugal) (manuscript on file at Latham & 
Watkins). 
114 Several similarities between the 1989 Proposal and the U.S. Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9657 (1983), have been noted by commentators. Among the most significant similarities 
are: 1) the use of joint and several strict liability; 2) a minimum of available defenses 
(neither measure allows defendant to escape liability by showing that its actions were 
approved by the relevant public authority); and 3) provision of liability despite attempted 
contractual limitations. See generally Pagliaro & Green, supra note 95, at 27; see also George 
C. Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E. McSlarrow, The Proposed European Community Directive on Civil 
Liability for Waste-TheImplications for u.s. Superfund Reauthorization in 1991, 46 B us. LAW. 
1 (1990). 
115 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 3. The 1989 Proposal's liability scheme was 
designed to be administered without prejudice to any rights or actions available to the 
plaintiff under applicable national law. Pagliaro & Green, supra note 95, at 33. 
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nature of this waste, until the moment when the damage or injury 
to the environment is caused."1l6 These entities were considered 
"original producers" and apparently were to remain liable for 
harm caused until the waste was deposited with an authorized 
disposal or treatment facility.ll7 Moreover, an entity could be 
deemed a "producer" by falling into anyone of three sub-cate-
gones. 
First, any entity which imported waste from outside the Com-
munity could be considered a producer for purposes of the 1989 
Proposal.1l8 Second, an entity transporting waste within the EC, 
with actual control of it, could be deemed a producer if, at the 
time of damage or injury to the environment, the entity could 
not identify the original producer "within a reasonable time." 
Alternatively, an entity which has received waste from outside the 
EC, could be deemed a producer if that entity had actual control 
of the waste at the time of the incident. 119 Third, installations 
that lawfully received waste for disposal or treatment were also 
subject to producer liability pursuant to Article 2(2)(c).120 The 
1989 Proposal expressly provided that a producer's liability could 
not be reduced through a showing that the actions or inactions 
of a third party caused the damage or injury to the environ-
ment. 121 The 1989 Proposal, however, also provided the producer 
with recourse against responsible parties pursuant to applicable 
national law in such situations. 122 
Although Article 3 of the 1989 Proposal created liability for 
waste producers,123 the term "waste" was not specifically defined. 
Instead, the 1989 Proposal referred to the definition of waste 
found in the Council's Framework Directive on Waste l24-then 
under consideration for amendment by the Council. 125 While the 
116 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 2(1 )(a). 
117 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 20. 
liS 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 2(2)(a). 
119 [d. at arts. 2(2)(b)(i) and (ii). 
120 [d. at art. 2(2)(c). 
121 [d. at art. 7(1). 
122 [d. 
123 [d. at art. 3. 
124 Framework Directive, supra note 6. The Framework Directive defined "waste" as 
"any substance or object that the holder disposes of or is required to dispose of pursuant 
to the provisions of national law in force." [d. at art. 1. 
125 The amendments to Directive 75/442 were adopted by the Council and can be 
found in the Council Directive of 18 March 1991 Amending Council Framework Directive 
on Waste 75/442,1991 OJ. (L 78) 32 [hereinafter Amended Framework Directive]. Article 
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1989 Proposal did not specify what was included in its definition, 
it expressly excluded from the definition of waste certain contro-
versial substances such as nuclear waste covered by national laws 
promulgated pursuant to the Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy. 126 The 1989 Proposal's definition 
also excluded waste under national laws giving effect to the In-
ternational Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dam-
age or the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Damage. 127 Finally, 
the Select Committee reported that the 1989 Proposal's definition 
of waste also excluded "mining waste, animal carcasses and ag-
ricultural waste of faecal origin, waste waters discharged into 
sewers and the aquatic environment, and emissions into the at-
mosphere."128 
2. Strict Joint and Several Liability 
The 1989 Proposal provided strict liability in cases of harm 
caused by waste. 129 The Explanatory Memorandum to the 1989 
Proposal asserted that the use of strict liability helps ensure that 
1 of the Amended Framework Directive defines waste as "any substance . . . in the 
categories set out in Annex I which the holder discards or intends or is required to 
discard." Id. at art. 1. Annex I of the Amended Framework Directive sets forth an 
extensive list of substances, including expired products, household wastes, and industrial 
wastes. See id. at Annex 1. Although the 1989 Proposal expressly adopted only Article 1 
of the Amended Framework Directive, Mr. Carel de Villeneuve of the Commission 
explained that by including Article 1, the 1989 Proposal "tacitly implies the exclusions 
... [contained in] Article 2 [of the Amended Framework Directive]." Supplementary 
Memorandum by Mr. Carel de Villeneuve, DG XI, Commission of the European Com-
munities, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 129 [hereinafter Villeneuve 
Supplementary Memorandum]. 
126 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 1(2). 
127 Id. 
128 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 14. The exclusions noted by the Select 
Committee were the result of the exclusions expressly listed in the Amended Framework 
Directive, supra note 125, at arts. 2(1)(a) and (b). 
In his Supplementary Memorandum to the Select Committee on the European Com-
munities, Mr. Carel de Villeneuve stated that under the 1989 Proposal, "'waste water' is 
water ... emitted into surface water through a sewer system or a drainage pipe." Mr. 
Villeneuve continued by pointing out that emissions from combustion plants would not 
be covered by the 1989 Proposal while emissions from waste treatment facilities would 
fall within its liability scheme. Villeneuve Supplementary Memorandum, supra note 125, 
at 129. 
129 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 3. It is important to note that liability under 
the Directive is in addition to any liability under the laws of individual Member States. 
See Pagliaro & Green, supra note 95, at 33. 
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the victim of harm caused by waste receives just compensation. 
It also stated that strict liability ensures that producers dispose of 
the waste by depositing it in an authorized disposal facility. Fur-
thermore, the Commission explained that a strict liability scheme 
ensures that societal costs associated with waste production are 
included in the cost of the goods giving rise to the production of 
waste. 130 In rejecting a fault-based liability scheme, the Commis-
sion defended its use of strict liability by stating that "[t]he concept 
of ... strict liability for environmental risks is everywhere gaining 
ground."131 The Commission pointed out that the comparable 
field of defective products had adopted the strict liability 
scheme,132 as had several international conventions. 133 The Com-
mission also noted that the draft of the Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail, and Inland Navigation Vessels (Convention 
on Civil Liability or Convention), then being negotiated within 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, was also 
based on strict liability principles. 134 
The 1989 Proposal further provided that strict liability should 
be joint and several when "two or more producers are liable for 
the same damage or injury to the environment."135 Therefore, 
under Article 5, liability would attach in full to a producer whose 
waste causes harm in any way to a victim; liability is unaffected 
even where the waste of another producer is a contributing cause 
of the harm. 136 Article 5's stipulation that the paying producer 
could seek redress against the non-paying producer pursuant to 
national law softened this somewhat severe result. 137 
130 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 113, at 42. 
'" [d. CERCLA is also based on the principle of strict liability for damage caused by 
waste. See Pagliaro & Green, supra note 95, at 27. 
m Council Directive 85/374, 19850.1. (L 210) 29. 
1" Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 113, at 42. 
134 [d.; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail, and Inland Navigation Vessels, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT TREA-
TIES, Supp. 14, at 81 (Oct. 10, 1989) (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers) [hereinafter 
Convention on Civil Liability]. For a brief summary of Member States' approaches to the 
use of no-fault liability for environmental risks, see SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, 
at 133 (Memorandum by Professor Terence Daintith, Director of Advanced Legal Studies, 
University of London). 
1S5 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 5. 
1S6 See SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 21 (discussing position of Confederation 
of British Industry regarding joint and several liability provision of 1989 Proposal) . 
.., [d. 
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Articles 6 and 7 of the 1989 Proposal established the only 
defenses to its liability scheme: force majeure and contributory 
negligence. 138 Liability could be avoided completely if the pro-
ducer could show that the harm resulted from "force majeure as 
defined in Community law."139 Article 7(2) provided a second 
defense if the damage or harm to the environment was caused 
both by the producer's waste and the fault of the injured party 
or its agent. 140 
3. Parties with Standing 
The 1989 Proposal gave the vIctIm or the victim's heirs the 
right to institute legal proceedings when damage141 to the person 
or person's property occurred.142 The 1989 Proposal also granted 
standing to "public authorities" and "common interest groups" 
to bring suits to remedy imminent or actual injury to the envi-
ronment. 143 The concept of "citizen suits" has received differing 
treatment in the EC.144 For example, the Netherlands and Lux-
embourg grant common interest groups standing to bring suits 
to protect the environment, while France and Italy allow citizen 
suits when joined to criminal proceedings under certain circum-
stances. 145 Recognizing that standing for interested citizens and 
organizations was controversial, the Commission expressly stated 
that its common interest group standing provision was not an 
attempt to harmonize Community law. Rather, the Commission 
13. 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at arts. 6 and 7. 
13. Id. at art. 6(1). The term "force majeure" as used in EC law is defined as "unusual 
and unforeseeable circumstances, beyond the trader's control, the consequences of which 
could not have been avoided even if all due care had been exercised .... " Case 145/85, 
Denkavit Belgi NV v. The State (Belgium), 1987 E.C.R. 565, 2 C.M.L.R. 679 (1987) 
(quoting Case 266/84, Denkavit France v. FORMA, 1986 E.C.R. 149, 3 C.M.L.R. 202 
(1987). 
140 Under this defense, producer liability may be reduced or disallowed. 1989 Proposal, 
supra note 18, at art. 7(2). 
141 The 1989 Proposal defined "damage" as "(i) damage resulting from death or physical 
injury; [or] (ii) damage to property." Id. at art. 2(1)(c). 
142 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 113, at 43. 
145 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at arts. 4(3) and 4(4). The Commission defined "injury 
to the environment" as "a significant and persistent interference in the environment 
caused by a modification of the physical, chemical or biological conditions of water, soil 
and/or air in so far as these are not considered to be damage [to property]." [d. at art. 
2(1)(d). 
144 See, e.g., Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 113, at 43. 
145 Id. 
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explained that it was merely trying to reach an "intermediate 
solution" to the various approaches utilized in the EC.146 
4. Remedies 
Under the 1989 Proposal, the identity of the party bringing 
the action determined which remedies would be available to the 
party. A private party could seek remedies to obtain: 
(a) the prohibition or cessation of the act causing the damage 
or injury to the environment; 
(b) the reimbursement of expenditure arising from measures 
to prevent the damage or injury to the environment; 
(c) the reimbursement of expenditure arising from measures 
to compensate for damage [to property] ... [and] 
(e) indemnification for the damage. 147 . 
Public authorities could seek remedies (a) and (b) above in suits 
brought to address injuries to the environment. 148 Furthermore, 
under Article 4(1)(d), public authorities could seek "the restora-
tion of the environment to its state immediately prior to the 
occurrence of injury to the environment or the reimbursement 
of expenditure incurred in connection with measures taken to 
this end."149 Pursuant to Article 4(4), common interest groups 
could seek "only prohibition or cessation of the act giving rise to 
the injury to the environment."150 Yet if the group had actually 
taken steps to prevent the injury, or to restore the environment, 
then it could request reimbursement for its efforts under Article 
4(1)(b) and (d).l5l 
If a plaintiff sought to restore the environment, its recovery 
would be subject to two provisos: (1) the costs of restoration could 
not exceed the benefit gained by the environment from the re-
pair; and (2) less costly alternative measures could not have been 
146 Id. 
147 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at arts. 4(1)(a), (b), (c) and (e). It is important to note 
that the 1989 Proposal did not provide for reimbursement of the "intrinsic value" of the 
environment injured, or for punitive recovery. The 1989 Proposal permitted indemnifi-
cation only for damage to property; injury to the environment gave the plaintiff the right 
to receive reimbursement for restorative or preventive measures only. Memorandum by 
Mr. Carel de Villeneuve, DG XI Commission of the European Communities, reprinted in 
SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 128 [hereinafter Villeneuve Memorandum]. 
148 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at arts. 4(1)(a) and (b). 
149 Id. at art. 4(3). 
150 Id. at art. 4(4). 
lSI Id. at art. 4(1)(b) and (d). 
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available. 152 If the first proviso was not met, the 1989 Proposal's 
language appeared to deny any restoration. Ostensibly, there was 
no provision for a "half-way solution" allowing for partial resto-
ration of the environment. 153 According to a memorandum to 
the Select Committee written by Mr. Carel de Villeneuve, DG XI 
of the Commission154 (Villeneuve Memorandum), a provision for 
partial restoration was unnecessary because Article 4(2)155 allowed 
a plaintiff to implement a less expensive alternative to restoration 
if it existed, or to request reimbursement for having done SO.156 
5. Burden of Proof 
Article 4(6) of the 1989 Proposal provided: "The plaintiff shall 
be required to prove the damages or injury to the environment, 
and show the overwhelming probability of the causal relationship 
between the producer's waste and the damage or ... injury to 
the environment suffered."157 According to the Villeneuve Mem-
orandum, the phrase "overwhelming probability" was uninten-
tionally included in the English version of the 1989 Proposa1. 158 
Article 4(6) should have contained the "balance of the probabil-
ities" test found in the French and German texts. 159 It was thus 
unclear what standard of proof a plaintiff would have been re-
quired to meet under the 1989 Proposal; however, it is likely that 
the less stringent "balance of probabilities" test would have been 
utilized rather than the "overwhelming" standard of the English 
text. 
6. Limitation Periods and Retroactive Effect 
Under Article 9 of the 1989 Proposal, a plaintiff was barred 
from bringing suit three years after the plaintiff discovered or 
152 /d. at art. 4(2). 
153 Villeneuve Memorandum, supra note 147, at 128. 
154 Each member of the Commission receives specific areas of responsibility, or port-
folios, and serves in the Directorate General (DG) for at least one of the Commission's 
twenty-three major subdivisions. DG XI is entitled "Environmental, Consumer Protection 
and Nuclear Safety." See WINTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 26 and app. F (listing 22 of the 
23 major subdivisions). 
155 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 4(2). 
156 [d. 
157 [d. at art. 4(6). 
158 Villeneuve Memorandum, supra note 147, at 128; ESC Opinion, supra note 1l0, at 
23. 
159 ESC Opinion, supra note 110, at 23. 
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should have discovered both the damage or injury to the envi-
ronment and the producer's identity.160 Under no circumstances 
could an action be brought after the expiration of "thirty years 
from the date on which the incident giving rise to the damage or 
injury to the environment occurred .... "161 Article 13 expressly 
provided that the rights and liabilities set out by the 1989 Proposal 
could not arise from "an incident which occurred before the date 
on which [the Directive was] implemented."162 
Referring to the language in Articles 10 and 13, the Villeneuve 
Memorandum stated that some difficulties could arise concerning 
persistent pollution163 due to the problems associated with deter-
mining what constituted an Article 10 or 13 "incident."I64 In his 
supplementary memorandum (Villeneuve Supplementary Mem-
orandum), Mr. Villenueve maintained that the term '''incident' 
[was] meant to refer to a human action or omission, such as the 
land filling of waste eventually leading to soil or ground water 
pollution."165 The Villeneuve Supplementary Memorandum in-
sisted that the Commission did not intend to apply the 1989 
Proposal retroactively.166 
7. Insurance 
The 1989 Proposal was silent on the issue of insurance in spite 
of the Council's mandate in the Directive on Waste Shipment that 
a mandatory insurance scheme be developed to cover civil liability 
for harm caused by waste. 167 The Commission explained its fail-
160 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 9(1). 
161 Id. at art. 10. 
162 Id. at art. 13. 
163 An example of persistent pollution is burial of waste at an authorized location in 
an authorized manner, but which subsequently leaks pollution that causes harm. The 
Select Committee inquired whether burying waste was an "incident or whether the sub-
sequent leakage was the occurrence targeted by Articles 10 and 13." Villeneuve Memo-
randum, supra note 147, at 128. 
164 Id. 
165 Villeneuve Supplementary Memorandum, supra note 125, at 130. 
166 Id. 
167 Directive on Waste Shipment, supra note 92, at 35. The Directive on Waste Shipment 
states: 
Id. 
The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
100 of the Treaty, determine not later than 30 September 1988 the conditions 
for implementing the civil liability of the producer [of waste] in the case of 
damage or that of any other person who may be accountable for the said damage 
and shall also determine a system of insurance. 
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ure to legislate mandatory insurance by pointing to the reluctance 
of insurance companies to become involved in covering environ-
mental risk for over 70 million European Currency Units 
(ECUs)l68 under a mandatory system. The European insurance 
industry apparently believed that for political reasons the mini-
mum insurance requirement could not be less than 70 million 
ECUS.169 The industry felt that the figure was too high and would 
distort the market by eliminating producers that statistically 
needed, and could only afford, a lesser amount of coverage yo 
The Villeneuve Supplementary Memorandum supported the in-
surers' position, claiming that the liability scheme devised by the 
Commission would result in extremely large claims-above 40 
million ECU s-in only the rarest of cases. Thus, the Villeneuve 
Supplementary Memorandum stated that producers should be 
insurable on a voluntary basis at amounts substantially below that 
called for in the Directive on Waste Shipment.l7J 
The ambiguities, vagueness and controversial issues plaguing 
the 1989 Proposal evoked a chorus of criticism from several sides. 
The substantive and substantial outcry forced the Commission to 
reevaluate its draft. It also forced the Commission to adopt a 
position in negotiations which could gain support from the many 
interests actively participating in the EC legislative process. 
D. Reactions to the 1989 Proposal 
The Commission worked behind closed doors to amend the 
1989 Proposal. Although the details of those bargaining sessions 
168 ld. at 35. The European Monetary System established the ECU in 1979 with the 
intention that it would ultimately become the single European currency. The ECU is not 
yet legal tender in any country, but its value is based on the currencies of Member States. 
See Keith Clark and Richard Parlour, EMU and Development of ECU-The Legallmplications, 
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 17-18. The ECU is currently worth approximately 1.25 U.S. 
dollars. See FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at 25. 
169 Seventy million ECUs was the minimum insurance set forth in the EC directive on 
product liability, Council Directive 85/374, 1985 OJ (L 210). See Explanatory Memoran-
dum, supra note 113, at 44. 
170 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 113, at 44. 
171 Villeneuve Supplementary Memorandum, supra note 125, at 130. Mr. Villeneuve 
claimed that clean-up costs would rarely exceed 40 million ECUs and, even in past 
instances when costs did exceed that estimate, insurance fully covered liability. ld. In 
comparison, the liability scheme utilized in CERCLA has severely tested the ability of 
insurers to provide coverage and has resulted in an estimated clean-up cost between $242 
billion and $612 billion. Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 114, at 2, citing Coming Clean, 
Office of Technology Assessment Report to Congress, ch. 4, at 194 (Oct. 19, 1989), 
reprinted in 19 CHEM. WASTE Lrr. REP. 466, 468 (Feb. 1990). 
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were not openly divulged, the issues subject to discussion and 
negotiation were the focus of significant public comment. The 
questions generating the greatest controversy included: (1) the 
scope of liability; (2) the strict liability standard; (3) standing; (4) 
the remedies available; (5) the possibility of retroactive effect; 
and (6) insurance. 
1. Scope of Liability 
The Commission's application of the "producer pays" principle 
to channel liability back to the producer regardless of when the 
producer controlled the waste, drew heavy criticism from many 
associations submitting position papers on the 1989 Proposal. The 
papers repeated the common theme that the producer pays prin-
ciple was contrary to established common and civil law principles 
equating control with responsibility and responsibility with liabil-
ity.172 The Conseil Europeen des Federations de L'Industrie Chi-
mique (CEFIC)173 claimed that the use of the producer pays 
principle led to unjust results because "[t]he transporter ... of 
waste providers] the producer with a service for which [the trans-
porter is] paid. Thus [the transporter] also assume[s] responsi-
bility and therefore liability. [T]he producer has no influence over 
the transporter during transportation and therefore the action 
of the latter should not trigger liability of the former."174 
CEFIC also felt that the proposal conflicted with the draft of 
the Convention on Civil Liability.175 The Convention, while em-
ploying a strict liability scheme, places liability on the entity with 
actual control of the dangerous good at the time of the damage. 176 
CEFIC reasoned that the 1989 Proposal's liability scheme did not 
fall within any of the reservations available to signatory states 
172 See ORGALIME-Liasion Group of the European Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic, 
and Metalworking Industries, EC Draft Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused 
by Waste: ORGALIME Position, at 1 (June 26, 1990) (on file at Latham & Watkins) 
[hereinafter ORGALIME Paper]; Conseil European des Federations de L'Industrie Chi-
mique, CEFIC Comments on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for 
Damage Caused by Waste, at 1 (Feb. 13, 1990) (on file at Latham & Watkins) [hereinafter 
CEFIC Paper]; and ESC Opinion, supra note 110, at arts. 5.1-5.3. 
173 CEFIC is a sectoral trade association which acts as the European chemical industry's 
chief advocate to the Council and Commission. Its membership consists of both national 
chemical producers and private sector manufacturers. GARDENER, supra note 39, at 51. 
174 CEFIC Paper, supra note 172, at 4. 
175 Convention on Civil Liability, supra note 134, at 81. 
176 [d. at 83. 
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under Article 24 of the Convention on Civil Liability, and the 
draft Convention expressly included hazardous waste within its 
scope. Therefore, those Members States which had promoted the 
Convention's liability scheme were bound to reject the Commis-
sion's Proposal. 177 
The European Federation of Waste Management (FEAD)178 
claimed that the producer pays principle gave rise to a distortion 
of competition because it provided that a producer remains liable 
until it deposits its waste with an authorized facility. FEAD argued 
that because the Member States' national laws set the criteria for 
becoming an authorized facility, the situation was ripe for a state 
to set low qualification standards for disposal facilities. Low qual-
ification standards would permit less expensive operation in some 
Member States, and in turn, lower costs for the producers dis-
posing of waste in those Member States. 179 
The 1989 Proposal's definition of waste provoked at least four 
major objections. The first objection concerned the nature of the 
substances included within the scope of the 1989 Proposal's def-
inition. Many associations asserted that if strict liability were ap-
plied to a waste producer, such liability should inure only to the 
producer of "hazardous waste."180 The Select Committee disa-
greed with the hazardous/nonhazardous distinction called for by 
many of the groups.181 It argued: "If wastes are not hazardous, 
then by definition no damage will result from their handling or 
177 CEFIC Paper, supra note 172, at 4. The Union of Industrial and Employers Con-
federations of Europe (UNICE) also submitted comments concerning the 1989 Proposal. 
UNICE is an officially recognized representative of European business interests and is 
composed of national business federations from both Member and non-Member States 
in Europe. GARDENER, supra note 39, at 40. UN ICE noted: 
Since the transport of dangerous wastes falls within the field of application of 
... [the Convention on Civil Liability] ... [it] will offer enough guarantees for 
the reparations of damage caused during the transport of such waste to be born 
by the transport operator. The protection of persons suffering damage during 
transport of dangerous waste does not therefore constitute justification for lia-
bility being channeled onto the producer of waste. 
Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe, Position Paper on the 
Proposal for a Directive in Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, at 2 (Oct. 20, 
1989) (on file at Latham & Watkins) [hereinafter UNICE Paper]. 
178 The European Federation of Waste Management is an association for European 
waste management companies and interests. 
179 European Federation of Waste Management, FEAD Statement on the Draft Direc-
tive of the Commission of the European Communities Concerning Civil Liability for 
Damage Caused by Waste, at 3 (May 2, 1990) (on file at Latham & Watkins) [hereinafter 
FEAD Paper]. 
180 CEFIC Paper, supra note 172, at 2; ORGALIME Paper, supra note 172, at 1. 
181 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 30. 
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treatment. The fact is . . . that almost all wastes are potentially 
hazardous in certain circumstances."182 The second objection to 
the definition of waste focused on its inclusion of secondary raw 
materials. 183 The Union of Industrial and Employers Confeder-
ations of Europe (UN ICE) argued that by including secondary 
raw materials within the scope of its waste definition, the 1989 
Proposal would impede the development of the recycling indus-
try. 184 The third objection was that no express definition of waste 
appeared in the 1989 Proposal. Rather, waste was defined merely 
by referring to a previously enacted Council Directive. 185 Finally, 
the Comite Europeen des Assurances (CEA)186 stated that the 
1989 Proposal's liability scheme could not be insured due in part 
to its broad and imprecise definition of waste. 187 
Another issue discussed in several position papers was whether 
Article 2's definition of "injury to the environment" was sufficient 
to accomplish the goals of the 1989 Proposal. The Select Com-
mittee noted that under the Commission's definition, no action 
for injury to the environment was available for harm to prop-
erty.188 Therefore, an action for injury to the environment could 
seldom be brought in a country like the United Kingdom where 
most of the land was privately owned. The Select Committee felt 
that the definition did not anticipate situations where the owner 
of the property being injured actually produced the harmful 
waste. 189 In such circumstances, there was technically no injury 
to the environment, and the only entity with standing to prevent 
the harm would be the one with the least incentive to do SO.190 
182 Id. 
183 Secondary raw materials are wastes used to create useable goods. An example of a 
secondary raw material is the emptied aluminum can which is purchased as scrap and 
then melted down to make aluminum foil. 
184 UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 4; see FEAD Paper, supra note 179, at 2. 
185 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 29-30. The Select Committee felt that 
reference to the Framework Directive of 1975 was inadequate to accomplish the stated 
goals of the 1989 Proposal and could lead to confusion. Id. at 30; see FEAD Paper, supra 
note 179, at 2. 
186 The Comite Europeen des Assurances is an association representing European 
insurance companies' interests. 
187 Comite Europeen des Assurances, Note of Comments on Community Proposals on 
Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, at 2 (Nov. 1990) (on file at Latham & Watkins) 
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A second criticism of the definition of "injury to the environ-
ment" was made by the ESC in its report to the Council. The 
ESC pointed out that the definition could include "modifications" 
resulting in a positive or productive "interference in the environ-
ment," and thus might be subject to interpretations that ran 
counter to the purposes of the 1989 Proposal. 191 Moreover, the 
ESC expressed its opinion that, given the time limitations set out 
in the 1989 Proposal, even if a modification were harmful in 
nature, it would be difficult to prove that such modification 
caused the interference in question. This would be especially true 
in scenarios where intervening modifications might also have af-
fected the interference during the proposed time period. 192 
2. Strict Liability 
With potential liability so high in the realm of waste disposal, 
business groups challenged the Commission's use of strict liability 
in the 1989 Proposal. In its position paper,193 UN ICE questioned 
whether a strict liability scheme should be applied to waste. 194 
UNICE claimed that strict liability was historically imposed only 
on inherently dangerous activities195 and in the product liability 
field. 196 UNICE maintained that waste could not be considered a 
"product," nor was all waste inherently dangerous. Therefore, it 
argued that strict liability should not be used in determining 
liability for producers of waste. 197 The Select Committee, how-
ever, disagreed with UNICE stating "strict civil liability should 
apply to those who carry out dangerous or potentially dangerous 
activities which give rise to environmental damage."198 The Select 
Committee noted that "it is clear that waste represents a serious 
environmental risk," and that "the problem must be tackled ... 
191 ESC Opinion, supra note 110, at 24. 
192 Id. 
193 UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at l. 
194 Id. 
195 UN ICE gave the example of damage caused by nuclear power plants. 
196 UN ICE Paper, supra note 177, at l. 
197 Id. CEA concurred with UNICE's sentiment that the 1989 Proposal should not 
contain a strict liability scheme. CEA felt that such a liability scheme, when combined 
with the Proposal's "producer pays" principle, the concept of "overwhelming probability 
of the causal relationship," and a doubtful definition of waste, would result in liabilities 
that could not be covered by any existing liability insurance technique. CEA Paper, supra 
note 187, at l. 
198 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 29. 
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by facilitating the recovery of damages by the introduction of 
strict civil liability."199 Thus, the two groups squarely set out the 
policy choices on how to define wastes and who should bear the 
burden of policing their production and transportation. 
As stated above, the only defenses the 1989 Proposal provided 
were force majeure and contributory negligence.2oo Moreover, the 
Proposal expressly imposed liability despite the producer's pos-
session of a permit to carryon the potentially harmful activity.201 
The exclusion of the "permit defense" from the 1989 Proposal 
attracted several comments. The Liaison Group of the European 
Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic, and Metalworking Industries 
(ORGALIME),202 UN ICE, and CEFIC all requested that the 
Commission include an exception to liability for those permitted 
to carryon an activity.203 The organizations reasoned that, be-
cause such permits are issued only after public authorities scru-
tinize the activity, the same authorities would not be justified in 
bringing suit under the 1989 Proposal for harm caused by the 
authorized activity.204 
The Select Committee reported to the House of Lords its ap-
proval of the permit defense exclusion.205 It stated that the de-
fense, if included in the 1989 Proposal, would inhibit the inter-
nalization of waste costs by allowing producers to omit the 
expense of covering potential harm from the price of their prod-
ucts. The Select Committee believed that the potential for harm 
would exist regardless of the producer's possession of a permit, 
and therefore, the expense of insuring against such harm should 
be borne by the purchasers of the producer's goods.206 The Select 
Committee also considered the argument that by not providing 
the permit defense, the Commission brought the permitting pro-
[99 [d. 
200 See supra Section II (C)(2). 
20[ 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 6(2). 
202 ORGALIME represents over 30,000 small and medium sized manufacturing com-
panies from 15 western European countries. ORGALIME Paper, supra note 177, at 1. 
203 [d. at 3-4; UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 5; CEFIC Paper, supra note 172, at 6. 
CEFIC felt that the possession of a permit should not provide a defense in instances 
where the permit was not complied with; it maintained, however, that the permit should 
provide a defense against harm arising from activities within the scope of the permit and 
that any such harm should be recoverable under a fault-based liability scheme. CEFIC 
Paper, supra note 172, at 6. 
204 ORGALIME Paper, supra note 172, at 3-4; UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 5. 
205 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 33. 
206 [d. 
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cess into disrepute. The Select Committee, however, dismissed 
this notion by explaining that permits are granted in recognition 
that a certain activity is inherently dangerous and hence should 
be regulated in a manner designed to reduce the identified risk. 
The Select Committee elaborated that a permit does not guar-
antee that all risk has been removed from the operation, and 
those who choose to engage in the permitted activity should be 
held responsible for harm that arises despite the regulatory pre-
cautions taken.207 
Many EC associations called for some form of the "state of the 
art" defense.208 The state of the art defense would excuse pro-
ducer liability "when the level of scientific ... knowledge available 
to the [producer] was such that he could not possibly foresee that 
damage would occur from the way in which the waste was han-
dled . . . . "209 The Select Committee cautioned that the defense 
was not to be confused with the "best practices" defense, under 
which a producer could free itself of liability by showing it had 
adhered to regulatory requirements. Instead, the state of the art 
defense would apply only when a producer could show "that even 
the most eminent scientist could not have known that the waste 
would give rise to the damage in the given circumstances."210 In 
a strict liability regime, of course, such a defense would conflict 
with the goal of internalizing societal costs associated with waste 
production. 
3. Parties With Standing 
The Commission's decision to allow common interest groups 
to sue for injury to the environment also drew the attention of 
various EC associations. Greenpeace called for the Commission 
to harmonize Community law211 by introducing into the 1989 
Proposal specific regulations governing standing for common in-
terest groups, thus removing any national law control over com-
207 Id. 
208 CEFIC Paper, supra note 172, at 7; UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 7; CEA Paper, 
supra note 187, at 2; ORGALIME Paper, supra note 172, at 5; SELECT COMMITTEE, supra 
note 102, at 34. 
209 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 34. 
210 Id. 
211 Phillippe Sands, In the Matter of the Proposed Council Directive on Liability for 
Damage Caused by Waste: General Comments on the Proposed Directive 4 (Sept. 4,1989) 
(prepared for Greenpeace International) (on file at Latham & Watkins). 
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mon interest group standing.212 Alternatively, FEAD called for 
the elimination of common interest group standing, stating that 
such standing was contrary to harmonization principles because 
public interest group standing was not available in all Member 
States.213 
The Select Committee contended that in most cases, the local 
authorities should decide whether to bring suit for injury to the 
environment because such injury is inflicted on the public.214 The 
Select Committee recognized, however, that instances could arise 
in which the authorities could not be relied upon to pursue an 
action for injury to the environment-notably, where the local 
authority produced the waste causing the harm.215 In those in-
stances, the Select Committee recommended that common inter-
est groups be given standing to recover the costs of preventive 
and restorative work.216 While noting that common interest group 
standing might be necessary in certain circumstances, the Select 
Committee acknowledged "substantial difficulties in giving such 
groups the right to seek the prohibition or cessation of an action 
which gives rise to injury to the environment."217 As an example 
of the difficulties, the Select Committee pointed to the problems 
associated with determining which groups would have standing 
and the plethora of unsubstantiated suits that could arise if all 
interest groups were allowed to sue under the 1989 Proposal.218 
4. Remedies 
Various EC political and industrial associations commented on 
the 1989 Proposal's provision for remedies to address injury to 
the environment. The most popular sentiment the associations 
expressed was that inclusion of a right to bring suit for injury to 
the environment was completely unnecessary. UN ICE, CEFIC, 
and ORGALIME all called for the provision'S removal.219 As 
UNICE stated in its position paper: "[By] introducing the notion 
212 Id. 
213 FEAD Paper. supra note 179. at 3. 





219 UNICE Paper. supra note 177. at 2-3; CEFIC Paper. supra note 172. at 4; ORGAL-
IME Paper. supra note 172. at 5. 
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of 'injury to the environment' into the area of civil liability, the 
Commission is making an innovation. The usual term for what 
has to be redressed under ... civil liability ... is 'damage."'22o 
UN ICE expressed its view that preventive and restorative mea-
sures for environmental damage should be reserved for public 
authorities or those holding a direct economic interest in the 
property at issue in order to avoid suits by "an indeterminate 
number of ... entities."221 
The Select Committee disagreed with UNICE and the other 
groups. In its report to the House of Lords, the Select Committee 
supported the Commission in its introduction of the concept of 
injury to the environment.222 The Select Committee declared: "If 
an activity causes the ... destruction of a particular habitat, then 
the person responsible for the activity should be accountable to 
society .... The availability of a legal remedy ... is an important 
development which should strengthen the cause of environmen-
tal protection."223 
5. Limitation Periods and Retroactive Effect 
Despite the Commission's stance to the contrary,224 many EC 
associations expressed concern about the possibility that the 1989 
Proposal's liability scheme could be retroactively applied. The 
source of this concern stemmed from Article 13's use of the term 
"incident" in its attempt to limit the 1989 Proposal's scope to 
prospective application. UNICE voiced its concern that the lan-
guage "arising from an incident" was ambiguous and thus subject 
to interpretations which could give the Commission's liability 
scheme retroactive effect. 225 The Select Committee felt that Ar-
ticle 13 could not be practically applied due to the difficulty in 
identifying when an "incident" took place.226 The Select Com-
220 UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 2. 
221 Id. at 3. 
222 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 30. 
223 Id. 
224 See supra Section II(C)(6). 
225 UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 6. 
226 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 34. The Committee singled out cases involving 
landfills as particularly troublesome scenarios in which to apply Article 13. The difficulty 
arises because these sites are often in operation for several years and contain mixes of 
various types of waste. Therefore, it would be difficult to determine which waste caused 
the harm or whether that particular waste was present at the site at the time the 1989 
Proposal took effect. Id. 
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mittee recommended that in place of Article 13, the Commission 
adopt an article providing a defense for defendants who could 
show that the pollution in question existed at the time the 1989 
Proposal became effective.227 
6. Insurance 
As noted above, the Commission failed to address the issue of 
insurance under the liability scheme it created.228 Regardless of 
whether producers would be required to obtain insurance or 
allowed to participate in voluntary coverage, the overriding ques-
tion raised by many EC organizations was whether the liability 
scheme was insurable at all. 229 Addressing the insurance question, 
the Select Committee stated: "In assessing the impact of measures 
designed to promote environmental protection, regard must be 
paid to the practical effect on industry."23o The Select Committee 
recognized that extremely high liability risks were often uninsur-
able and eventually could inhibit investor activity in the industry 
subject to such liability. The Select Committee concluded that it 
was vital that the liability imposed by the 1989 Proposal be in sur-
able. 231 
The European insurance industry's reaction to the 1989 Pro-
posal was strong. CEA expressed the European insurers' "very 
grave concerns" regarding the insurability of the proposal. CEA 
explained that the coverage of any liability scheme depended on 
certain conditions. 
Firstly, it must be possible to study the probability of occur-
rence of the event to be covered using objective data resulting 
especially from observation of past events. Secondly, the cost 
of the risk to be covered must be able to be quantified so that 
insurers can mobilize the necessary reserves for an eventual 
settlement of a claim. Furthermore, the constitution, over a 
very long period, of technical provisions for claims which 
227 [d. The Select Committee maintained that such an approach would encourage 
landfill operators to properly monitor the composition of their landfills and time of waste 
deposit. [d. 
228 See supra Section II(C)(7). 
229 See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 35; see also UN ICE Paper, supra note 
177, at 7. 
230 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 35. 
231 [d. UN ICE echoed the Committee's position by stating: "It would be unacceptable 
to industry if legislation were passed which made it liable for risks without insurance 
against these risks being available on the market." UN ICE Paper, supra note 177, at 7. 
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have yet to occur, is particularly difficult ... when the eco-
nomic and monetary situation is uncertain. 232 
CEA declared that the Commission's liability scheme failed to 
meet its conditions due to the 1989 Proposal's introduction of 
new legal concepts, imprecise definitions, and the absence of the 
state of the art defense.233 
The consensus reached between UNICE and the ESC was that 
the Commission was correct in not requiring producers to obtain 
minimum insurance coverage. They also agreed that any future 
amendment of the 1989 Proposal should likewise avoid manda-
tory insurance provisions.234 The Select Committee disagreed, 
however, stating that the only way to guarantee victims of waste 
just compensation was to require producers to obtain mlmmum 
coverage.235 
III. PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON CIVIL LIABILITY 
FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY WASTE: 1991 AMENDED DRAFT 
Pursuant to the cooperation procedure of Article 100a,236 the 
Council submitted the Commission's 1989 Proposal to Parliament 
for its opinion.237 Following Parliament's first reading of the 1989 
Proposal, it issued its Resolution on the Commission Proposal for 
a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste 
(Resolution) on November 22, 1990.238 Parliament sent its Reso-
232 CEA Paper, supra note 187, at 2. 
233 CEA claimed that the concept of injury to the environment gave rise to liability 
which could not be assessed on a monetary basis. It also noted that the 1989 Proposal's 
use of the phrase "overwhelming probability," with regard to the burden of proof to be 
met by plaintiffs, was new and would thus be subject to various interpretations throughout 
the Community. CEA expressed its opinion that when the above factors are combined 
with a system of no-fault liability, inadequate and badly defined defenses, and a limitation 
period of 30 years, the European insurance community would not be able to cover the 
resulting "massive potential costs." [d. 
The Select Committee similarly felt that the 1989 Proposal's liability scheme was un-
insurable. The Select Committee suggested that coverage might be obtainable if the 
Commission adopted the state of the art defense, restricted liability to the entity with 
control of the waste at the time of the harm, and set a cap on financial liability. SELECT 
COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 35. 
234 See UNICE Paper, supra note 177, at 7; see also ESC Opinion, supra note 110, at 25. 
235 SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 35. 
236 See supra Section I(B). For a detailed description of the EC institutional legislative 
interplay, see generally HARTLEY, supra note 28. 
237 See supra Section I(B)(1). 
238 Parliament Resolution on the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil 
Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1990 OJ. (C 324) 248 [hereinafter Resolution]. 
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lution to the Commission requesting it to amend the 1989 Pro-
posal to reflect the provisions of the Resolution. Parliament also 
sent its Resolution to the Council to aid in preparation of its 
"common position." Prior to the Council's adoption of a common 
position, the Commission amended the 1989 Proposal and resub-
mitted the new version (Amended Proposal) to the Council.239 
The Amended Proposal included several of Parliament's positions 
and many viewed it as a compromise between the industry-ori-
ented Commission and the relatively "green" Parliament.24o 
A. Parliament's Position 
In its Resolution, Parliament recommended numerous signifi-
cant changes to the Commission's 1989 Proposal. 241 In particular, 
Parliament suggested that the cause of action-"injury to the 
environment"-be changed to "impairment of the environ-
ment."242 Parliament defined "impairment of the environment" 
as "any significant physical, chemical or biological deterioration 
of the environment insofar as this is not considered to be damage 
[to person or property]."243 The Resolution also recommended 
eliminating authorized disposal and treatment facilities from Ar-
ticle 2's definition of "producer."244 
In what appeared as an acknowledgment of the positions taken 
by several EC associations,245 Parliament seemed to suggest that 
the producer pays principle be removed from the Commission's 
1989 Proposal and replaced with one based upon control.246 Par-
liament then stated, however, that "[ w ]aste shall be deemed to 
remain under the control of the producer . . . until it is subse-
quently consigned to [an authorized eliminator],"247 Without 
more, there would have been no functional difference between 
Parliament's revised version of the 1989 Proposal and the Com-
mission's original provision. 248 Parliament, however, suggested 
239 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, at 6. 
240 See Luiki & Stephenson, supra note 2, at 405. 
241 See generally Resolution, supra note 238. 
242 [d. at 251, art. 2(1). 
243 [d. 
244 [d. at 251, art. 2(2)(c). 
245 See supra Section II(D)(1). 
246 Resolution, supra note 238, at 252, art. 3(1). 
247 [d. at 252, art. 3(2). 
248 Compare 1989 Proposal, supra note 18, art. 3 with Resolution, supra note 238, at 252, 
arts. 3(1) and (2). 
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that producer liability be limited to the amount exceeding the 
carrier's liability under the Convention on Civil Liability if the 
waste had been transferred into the control of a carrier subject 
to the Convention, and such waste was in the carrier's control at 
the time the harm occurred. 249 
Parliament made extensive changes to Article 4 of the 1989 
Proposa1.250 The changes allowed Member States to determine 
which entities would be able to sue under the Directive251 and the 
remedies available to each category of plaintiff.252 The changes 
also modified the plaintiff's burden of proof in bringing its 
case,253 and allowed Member States to determine "whether and 
249 Resolution, supra note 238, at 252, art. 3(3). 
250 Parliament's revisions to Article 4 provided: 
1. The National laws of the Member States shall determine: 
(a) the person who may bring a legal action in the event of damage or impair-
ment to the environment caused or about to be caused by waste; 
(b) the remedies available to such persons shall include: 
(i) an injunction prohibiting the act or correcting the omission that has caused 
or may cause the damage and/or compensation for the damage suffered; 
(ii) an injunction prohibiting the act or correcting the omission that has 
caused or may cause impairment of the environment; 
(iii) an injunction ordering the reinstatement of the environment and/or 
ordering the execution of preventive measures and the reimbursement of costs 
lawfully incurred in reinstating the environment and in taking preventive mea-
sures (including costs of damage caused by preventive measures); 
(c) the burden of proof on the plaintiff, when affirming the causal link between 
the waste ... and the damage or impairment to the environment suffered or 
likely to be suffered . . . ; the burden of proof shall be no higher than the 
standard burden of proof in civil law; 
(d) whether and to what extent damages for loss of profit or economic loss 
may be recoverable. 
4. Common interest groups or associations, which have as their object the pro-
tection of nature and the environment, shall have the right to bring legal pro-
ceedings to pursue any remedy under paragraph l(b) or to join in legal pro-
ceedings that have already been brought. However, in order to avoid a 
proliferation of litigation, Member States may limit the number of such groups 
... by authorizing ... only certain groups ... to exercise the right provided for 
under this paragraph. 
Id. at 252-53, art. 4. 
251 Id. at 252, art. 4(1)(a). Under Parliament's provisions, Member States' ability to 
determine which parties could sue under the Directive was not absolute. Such discretion 
was limited by the Resolution's express grant of standing to public interest groups "which 
have as their objective the protection of nature and the environment .... " Id. at art. 4(4). 
Member States, however, were free to determine which public interest groups would 
qualify for Article 4(4) standing. Id. Thus, the limitation on Member States' discretion 
was itself somewhat diluted. 
252 Id. at 252-53, arts. 4(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii); see supra note 250 for text of the provision. 
253 Resolution, supra note 238, at 253, art. 4(l)(c). The Resolution called for the standard 
burden of proof utilized throughout the EC in civil cases. This amendment would correct 
the purportedly mistaken use of the "overwhelming probability" test found in the English 
version of the 1989 Proposal. See supra Section II(C)(5). 
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to what extent damages for loss of profit or economic loss . . . 
[could] be recover[ed]."254 
Parliament's revisions also included two new defenses. The first 
gave a defendant the right to exculpate itself by showing that a 
third party who acted with the intent to cause the harm did cause 
the harm suffered.255 The second new defense provided that 
carriers and waste disposers would be free from liability if they 
could prove that the consigning producer had misrepresented 
the true character of the transferred waste.256 
Article 8a of the Resolution called for the Commission to 
amend the 1989 Proposal to include a provision requiring Mem-
ber States to repair damaged or impaired lands if the party liable 
for the harm could not be identified.257 Moreover, under the 
Resolution an insurer of an entity that produced or eliminated 
waste would be personally liable to a party injured by the waste 
if the producer or eliminator became insolvent prior to the in-
jury.258 
Despite the insurance community's broad opposition,259 Parlia-
ment felt that the 1989 Proposal should call for mandatory in-
surance "or some other financial security" to cover the risks aris-
ing under its liability scheme.26o The risks created by the 1989 
Proposal would be subject to limitation by Article 11 (2) of the 
Resolution. It provided that Member States could set limits on 
the liability of anyone defendant, but that such limits could not 
be lower than 70 million ECU s for damage to the environment 
and 50 million ECUs for impairment of the environment.261 The 
Resolution also stated that no limit should be available to a de-
fendant who acted with the intent to cause the harm inflicted.262 
B. Significant Revisions in the Amended Proposal 
Much of the Commission's 1989 Proposal remained unchanged 
after the July 1991 amendments. This section will therefore ad-
254 Resolution, supra note 238, at 253, art. 4(1)(d). 
255 [d. at 254, art. 6(1)(a). 
256 [d. at 254, art. 7(1). 
257 [d. at 255, art. 8a. 
258 [d. at 256, art. 13a. 
259 See supra Section I1(D)(7). 
260 Resolution, supra note 238, at 255, art. II(I). 
261 [d. at 255, art. II (2). 
262 [d. at 255, art. 11(4). 
280 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.2 
dress only those articles that were revised following Parliament's 
suggestions or according to the Commission's initiatives. As noted 
above, a substantial portion of the Commission's revised draft is 
the result of the compromise it reached with Parliament.263 One 
of the most notable results of the compromise was the adoption 
of Parliament's revisions to Article 4.264 The revisions give Mem-
ber States the right to determine who can bring suit under the 
Amended Proposal, outline the remedies available, set the burden 
of proof to be met, and determine whether economic loss is 
recoverable.265 The Commission also adopted Parliament's sug-
gestion that a defense for intentional intervention by third parties 
be available to defendants.266 The Amended Proposal thus allows 
a producer to avoid liability by showing that, due to no fault of 
the producer, an intentional act or omission of a separate entity 
caused the damage or impairment of the environment.267 
Article 7 of the Amended Proposal partially incorporates Par-
liament's suggested defense regarding the producer's intentional 
misstatements to subsequent consignees concerning the character 
of waste. In Parliament's Resolution such a defense was available 
to the carrier and waste disposer.268 The Amended Proposal, 
however, allows only the eliminator of waste to assert the de-
fense. 269 
Article 11 of the Amended Proposal addresses the issue of 
insurance. Article 11 adopted the Resolution's position270 that a 
mandatory insurance provision should be included in the 
Amended Proposa1.271 The Commission, however, conspicuously 
failed to include the liability caps272 provided for in Parliament 
Resolution Article 11,273 which some EC associations considered 
26. See supra Section III(A). 
264 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 4. 
265 See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text. 
266 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 6(l)(a). 
267 [d. 
268 Resolution, supra note 238, at 254, art. 7(1). Parliament's desire to hold carriers 
liable for harm caused during transport-up to the limits set by the Convention on Civil 
Liability-necessitated the inclusion of the carrier within the defense provision. [d. at 252, 
art. 3(3). 
269 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 7(1). The defense was not granted to 
carriers due to the Commission's position that, under the Amended Proposal, carriers 
generally are not to be directly liable for harm caused by waste during transport. See id. 
at arts. 2 and 3. 
270 See Resolution, supra note 238, at 255, art. 11 (1). 
271 Amended Proposal, supra note 18, at art. 11(1). 
272 See id. at art. 11. 
273 Resolution, supra note 238, at 255, art. 11(2). 
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key to achieving insurability of the Directive's liability scheme.274 
In what must have been an acknowledgment of the need to clarify 
terms for insurance purposes, the Commission adopted Parlia-
ment's revision of "injury to the environment" to "impairment of 
the environment" and the Resolution's accompanying defini-
tion.275 
The only significant change in the Amended Proposal not sug-
gested by Parliament was the Commission's treatment of Article 
3 regarding cases of damage or impairment to the environment 
caused by the actions or omissions of a carrier and covered by 
the Convention on Civil Liability.276 Under the Amended Pro-
posal's provisions, the carrier will be liable according to the Con-
vention's liability scheme, while the producer of the waste will 
remain strictly liable under the Directive on Civil Liability.277 This 
provision is consistent with the Commission's position that the 
producer, and not the transporter, should be subject to the 
Amended Proposal's liability scheme.278 
CONCLUSION 
The Community reacted to the Amended Proposal and the 
consensus problems it posed by placing the document in legisla-
tive limbo. Its fate is unsure. The political exercise of drafting, 
critiquing, and revising the proposed directive has exposed con-
flicting positions on environmental regulation which go to the 
heart of crafting a comprehensive approach to waste manage-
ment. The questions arising from these conflicting positions are 
profound-who shall bear responsibility for preventing or re-
mediating contamination; who can claim injury; what are dam-
ages; can the risk be insured. Consideration of the proposal has 
forced the Community to confront these questions, which are 
integral not only to the Amended Proposal but to its overall 
environmental strategy. Moreover, the issues the Amended Pro-
posal raises highlight the fundamental structural weakness of the 
EC political arrangement. The creation of a waste regulatory 
274 See supra note 232. 
275 Amended Proposal, supra note IS, at art. 2(l)(d). The Amended Proposal defines 
impairment of the environment as "any significant physical, chemical or biological dete-
rioration of the environment insofar as this is not considered to be damage [to person or 
property]." [d. 
276 [d. at art. 3(1). 
277 [d. 
278 See id. at arts. 2 and 3. 
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regime presupposes both a general consensus on the principles 
which provide the basis for environmental regulation and a po-
litical system in place to process and implement such legislation. 
The resolution of the issues the Amended Proposal has raised 
is intertwined with the perennial EC problem of sovereignty. The 
EC continues to struggle through its basic governmental functions 
of developing legislation, coaxing Member States to adopt con-
forming laws, and monitoring individual enforcement. The Com-
munity is not a recast version of the United States, needing to 
fine tune its interpretation of federalism. Rather it is a suprana-
tional organization which strives to forge consensus among very 
different Member States in a unique political context. It has little 
direct power to compel countries to accept its direction. The 
legislative and legal mechanisms created by treaty are still evolv-
ing. Harmonizing laws, let alone enforcing them, remains a 
daunting task. 
Almost twenty years have elapsed since the Community first 
officially mandated the establishment of a waste regulatory re-
gime. Much has occurred in those decades, including the explo-
sion in environmental awareness and modifications to the EC 
legislative system. The confluence of these two movements paved 
the way for the thoughtful debate on the proposed directive over 
the last three years. Now the issues are fully on the table and the 
players can analyze their conflicting positions and arguments. 
The blessing and curse of open and intelligent debate is that it 
places in stark relief differing credible views. The parties can now 
reach a compromise, make specific policy choices on basic envi-
ronmental principles, or remain paralyzed. The logjam must be 
broken by passing the Amended Proposal as is, after further 
amendment, or by scrapping the directive and crafting a new one 
within the broader framework of a comprehensive approach to 
environmental regulation. 
The fate of the proposed directive is unclear, but its stormy 
legislative history may provide the impetus for the EC to under-
take a serious effort to construct a comprehensive waste manage-
ment regime. By focusing on the principles set forth in the 1989 
Proposal and its amended version, a broad spectrum of EC actors 
has revealed its position on critical environmental issues. Now the 
Community must seize this opportunity to make fundamental 
policy choices which will chart not only the future of the proposed 
Directive on Civil Liability for Waste but the course of the EC's 
overall approach to environmental regulation. 
